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In a recent exchange, Moro (2014) and
Pulvermüller (2014) re-open a long-
standing debate in the language sciences.
Ever since the 1975 Royaumont encounter
that set the agenda for linguistics and the
classical cognitive sciences, generative lin-
guists, whose ultimate goal we take to be
to shed light on the biological basis for
language, have rejected any attempt of a
rapprochement between natural language
syntax and action grammar (motor plan-
ning), even if the hierarchical structure
of plans is well established in the litera-
ture (see already Miller et al., 1960). The
parallelism between syntax and action
grammar has enjoyed a new lease of life
recently (Jackendoff, 2007; Fujita, 2009;
Pulvermüller, 2010; Stout, 2010; Arbib,
2012; Knott, 2012), with neuroscientists
like Pulvermüller ready to reap the fruits,
but Moro reiterates the standard genera-
tive stance that the parallelism is at best a
metaphor.
Moro usefully lays out two classic argu-
ments against a deep relation between syn-
tax and action: (i) the atomic units these
systems manipulate are very different, and
(ii) the locality conditions or constraints
characteristic of syntax are not found in
the domain of action.
We think Moro’s arguments fail, for
reasons that are worth highlighting, for
both sides of the debate: First, the very
same arguments Moro puts forth could
be raised to argue against a relation-
ship between syntax and other human
capacities such as mathematics or music,
although here generative linguists have
in fact been known to promote such
parallelisms, suggesting that they see some
underlying similarity despite the differ-
ences in terms of lexical units or locality
constraints. Because we think that the
pursuit of these parallelisms have led to
substantial progress (see Patel, 2008 in
the domain of music), we don’t see why
the domain of action should be treated
differently.
Second, we think that Moro’s classical
stance is counterproductive on evolution-
ary grounds. In fact, it suffers from the
same limitations that Gary Marcus points
out for classical modularity (Marcus,
2006). Marcus argues forcefully, and per-
suasively, for the need for a serious injec-
tion of Darwinian thinking in the domain
of cognitive science, and we would add,
especially in the context of generative
grammar. Specifically, we think that in his
arguments Moro underestimates the ben-
efits of Darwin’s great idea of descent with
modification. “Descent” thinking is key to
construct cognitive phylogenies, and sev-
eral authors have provided experimental
arguments in favor of a relation between
syntax and action grammar in this context
(Stout, 2010; Uomini and Meyer, 2013).
But as Darwin knew well, descent is often
accompanied by modification. Hence we
expect differences across related domains.
Such differences may in fact obscure deep
similarities (cf. the vibrant area of research
on deep homologies in current biology).
We think that at this point, focusing on
the similarities between syntax and action
grammar could lead productive work on
neurolinguistics, along the lines argued for
by Pulvermüller (see Roy et al., 2013 for
work on specific language impairment).
In addition, we think that both Moro
and Pulvermüller may not be focusing
on the most productive mode of com-
paring syntax and action. Both authors
focus on the hierarchical structures in both
domains, but we contend that it may be
more productive to focus on the genera-
tive operation underlying these structures
[what Moro refers to as Merge, although
we want to keep an open mind about
what the relevant elementary computa-
tional mechanism(s) may be]. Breaking
down the relevant domains into prim-
itive operations would enable the (we
think, very real) possibility that the same
underlying mechanism is deployed in a
variety of cognitive domains, with dif-
ferences arising from the ways in which
these domains are embedded within larger
cognitive systems. (Such differences may
well be the causes of numerous dissoci-
ation effects reported in the modularity
literature.) For instance, the fact that nat-
ural language syntax manipulates units
with conceptual content may account for
certain differences between, say, language
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and music, even if the core combina-
torial operation is shared by the two
systems (Roberts, 2012). Other proper-
ties of operations, such as binarity (giv-
ing rise to binary branching structures),
may be relaxed in domains like arithmetic
(Chomsky, 2008) or vision (Jackendoff,
2007), and may therefore be best thought
of as domain-specific constraints on the
same operation imposed by different inter-
facing systems.
Finally, as linguists, we would like to
point out that the two arguments offered
by Moro against a deep relation between
syntax and action grammar are somewhat
obsolete in the context of current linguis-
tic theorizing. Much current work in syn-
tax has come to view “words” (the atoms
of computation that Moro takes to make
syntax different) as the output of the syn-
tactic computation, not its input (Halle
and Marantz, 1993, and much work in the
framework of Distributed Morphology).
As for locality conditions, here too syntac-
ticians have come to the conclusion that
these may be best seen as constraints act-
ing as post-syntactic filters (see Boeckx,
2012 for a recent survey). So both “words”
and “locality” effects may not be so intrin-
sic properties of natural language syntax
(or better said, its core computational pro-
cess), and should therefore not stand in
the way of possible relations across mental
capacities of our species.
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